We estimate that (i) the oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) strain that emerged in 2007 was 4% (3-5%) 39 more transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor and (ii) the oseltamivir-resistant 40 pandemic A(H1N1) strain that emerged and circulated in Japan during 2013-2014 was 24% (17-41 30%) less transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart. We show that in the event of 42 large-scale antiviral interventions during a pandemic with co-circulation of AVS and AVR strains, 43 our method can be used to inform optimal use of antivirals by monitoring intrinsic AVR fitness and 44 drug pressure on the AVS strain. 45 46
Summary 21 22
Background 23
Antivirals (e.g. oseltamivir) are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. In 2007, an 24 oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) strain emerged and spread to global fixation within one 25
year. This showed that antiviral-resistant (AVR) strains can be intrinsically more transmissible than 26 their contemporaneous antiviral-sensitive (AVS) counterpart. Surveillance of AVR fitness is 27 therefore essential. 28 29
Methods 30
We define the fitness of AVR strains as their reproductive number relative to their co-circulating 31 AVS counterparts. We develop a simple method for real-time estimation of AVR fitness from 32 surveillance data. This method requires only information on generation time without other specific 33 details regarding transmission dynamics. We first use simulations to validate this method by 34
showing that it yields unbiased and robust fitness estimates in most epidemic scenarios. We then 35 apply this method to two retrospective case studies and one hypothetical case study. 36
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Influenza antiviral drugs are important for mitigating influenza epidemics. The neuraminidase (NA) 57 inhibitor oseltamivir is the most commonly used influenza antivirals (1) and has been extensively 58 stockpiled by many countries for pandemic preparedness (2). The effectiveness of antivirals is 59 threatened by emergence and spread of antiviral resistance (AVR) viruses. For oseltamivir, the 60 most commonly detected resistance mutation in A(H1N1) viruses is the NA H275Y substitution. 61
Before 2007, emergence of oseltamivir-resistant influenza viruses were sporadically reported, and 62 the fitness of detected resistant viruses had always been substantially compromised (3) . As such, 63
there was a consensus that AVR influenza viruses would always be outcompeted by their antiviral-64 sensitive (AVS) counterparts, and hence posed only minimal threat to public health. 65 66 Such conventional wisdom was refuted by events in 2007-2008 -a new oseltamivir-resistant 67 A(H1N1) virus emerged and displaced its contemporaneous oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart to 68 become the dominant A(H1N1) strain globally within only 12 months (4). The emergence and rapid 69 fixation of this oseltamivir-resistant virus was not driven by widespread use of oseltamivir (4, 5) . 70
This event thus proved that AVR viruses are not necessarily less transmissible than their AVS 71 counterparts. Furthermore, in the context of large-scale antiviral intervention during a pandemic, 72 AVR fitness may be enhanced by the drug pressure on the AVS strain such that an intrinsically less 73 transmissible AVR strain may become more fit than the AVS strain. Timely and accurate assessment 74 of AVR fitness is therefore essential for informing situational awareness and optimal use of 75 antivirals during both inter-pandemic and pandemic periods (6) . 76
We assume that there is only one transmissible AVR strain over the course of a single epidemic 90 wave constituted by the A subtype or B lineage to which the AVR strain and its antiviral-sensitive 91 counterpart (the AVS strain) belong. We define the intrinsic AVR fitness as the ratio of the basic 92 reproductive number of the AVR strain to that of the AVS strain ( 0 those from other subtypes and lineages) and pathogens are the same for both strains. 105 5. AVR fitness does not depend on age. 106 6. Age-specific susceptibility to the AVR virus is the same as that to the AVS virus. 107
Assumptions 5 and 6 are relatively less likely to hold, e.g. high-risk groups may be more likely to 108 receive antiviral prophylaxis, susceptibility to the AVR virus may be different from that to the AVS 109 virus (9). In the Appendix (see Appendix page 5), we extend our method to allow relaxation of these 110 two assumptions. 
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where ( ) i t is the total incidence rate of AVR and AVS infections, R g and S g are the generation 121 time distributions for AVR and AVS infections, respectively. To verify the accuracy of this 122 approximation, we randomly generate 100 epidemic scenarios driven by the UK contact matrix 123 
Inference of AVR fitness 136
Our method requires the following two streams of data (for the subtype or lineage under 137 investigation): 138 1. The incidence rate ( ) i t or its proxy, e.g. based on the daily number of laboratory confirmed 139 infections in the Hong Kong E-Flu system (11), Flu Near You (12) , or other proxies used for 140 calculating influenza excess mortality (13) . We denote this data stream by ( ) i t  . These data 141 are typically confounded with temporal fluctuation in reporting rate and laboratory testing 142 capacity. Our method, however, is robust against such fluctuation (see Results). tested on day d that are found to be positive and negative for AVR, respectively. The 145
subjects selected for AVR testing should (i) have not been treated with antivirals for their We substitute ( ) i t with its proxy ( ) i t  in equation (1) and denote the resulting approximation by 149
where , p sens and p spec are the sensitivity and 152 specificity of AVR testing. With this likelihood and uniform priors, we estimate AVR fitness σ using 
Validation of the AVR fitness inference method 156
To validate our method, we simulate 100 stochastic realizations of the data streams for each of the 157 100 epidemic scenarios generated earlier assuming that (i) daily reporting proportions are uniform 158 random variables ranging between 0.5% and 2%; and (ii) daily AVR testing capacity is 2, 5, 10, 20 159 or 80 isolates. AVR fitness is then inferred at the end of each epidemic. 160 161
Case Studies 162
After validating our method, we apply it to three case studies: 163
A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus in 2007 -2008.
To 164 estimate the (intrinsic) fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain in comparison to its 165 oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor, we retrieve the data on influenza virus activity and AVR 166 surveillance for 10 countries/regions from published literature and public online data 167 (Tables A1-A3 on page 13-17 of Appendix, Figure 3 ). We assume that AVS and AVR 168 infections had the same generation time distribution because there is no published evidence 169 that indicates the contrary. Based on published serial interval estimates, we assume that the 170 generation time distribution was lognormal with mean 2.8 days and coefficient of variation 171 0.54 (14) . We first obtain a pooled estimate of AVR fitness by assuming that AVR fitness was 172 the same in all populations. We then estimate AVR fitness in each population separately and 173 compare them. 174
A retrospective study of the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Japan
Newcastle, Australia in 2011 (15) and Hokkaido, Japan in 2013-2014 (16) . In the Japan 178 cluster, the oseltamivir-resistant virus was causing community outbreaks until it was 179 displaced by its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart (Figure 2) . We apply our method to 180 estimate the fitness of this oseltamivir-resistant strain using published data (16) and the 181 generation time distribution in case study 1. to exceed 1 with high probability (say, above 0.9 for one week), then there is compelling 198 evidence that an increasing proportion of severe cases would be AVR and hence not 199 treatable with the antiviral. We assume that in response to this alert, antiviral use would be 200 suspended except for treating high-risk and severe cases as policymakers deliberate (i) how 201 to strategically adjust antiviral use to strike a balance between reducing transmission of 202 AVS infections and increasing the number of severe AVR infections , and (ii) whether 203 alternative treatment options such as convalescent plasma and antivirals with different 204 resistance mechanisms should be considered (7, 20, 21, 23) . The objective of this case study 205 is to demonstrate how estimates of 0 σ and μ can be used to build an evidence base for this 206 decision-making process. 207
The sponsors of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data 210 interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all the data in 211 the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. 212
Validating the method for estimating AVR fitness 215 
Case study 1: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus, 2007 -2008 239
The pooled (intrinsic) AVR fitness estimate is 1.04 (95% credible interval 1.03-1.05), i.e. the when we increase (decrease) T g by one day. If the data were available in real-time, reliable fitness 243 estimates would have been available by late February 2008, which was 15 weeks after the 244 oseltamivir-resistant virus was first identified in Norway and months before it became dominant in 245 populations outside Europe (24) . If we estimate AVR fitness in each population separately, the 246 results suggest that the oseltamivir-resistant strain was more transmissible than the oseltamivir-247 sensitive strain only in Canada, Luxembourg, the UK, Germany and France, but not in the other five 248 populations (Figure 3) . In particular, there is no strong evidence that the oseltamivir-resistant 249 strain was more transmissible than its oseltamivir-sensitive counterpart in Japan (25) . The intrinsic 250 AVR fitness estimates remain unchanged when the effect of drug pressure in Japan is explicitly 251 modelled (see Appendix page 4). 252 253
Case study 2: Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Japan, 2013-2014 254
We estimate that this oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was 24% (17%-30%) less 255 transmissible than the oseltamivir-sensitive strain that displaced it (Figure 4) . Such differential 256 transmissibility was not detected by in vitro competitive growth and in vivo ferret transmission 257 experiments (16) . In retrospect, our method could have correctly predicted that the AVR virus was 258 less transmissible that its AVS counterpart (with posterior probability > 0.95) after both viruses 259 had co-circulated for two weeks, which corresponds to four weeks before the AVR virus was analyses. However, patient-specific clinical and epidemiological data for these isolates, such as 293 gender, age, geographic location, healthcare setting, antiviral treatment history and vaccination 294 status, are often incomplete or missing, especially when these samples are not collected by the 295 sentinel surveillance systems. Routine collection of these data (e.g. antiviral treatment history) can 296 enhance the performance of AVR surveillance. 297
298
The turnaround time of AVR testing depends on our knowledge regarding the genetic mechanisms 299 that confer AVR. If the genetic markers associated with AVR are known a priori (e.g. the NA H275Y 300 mutation (27)), the turnaround time for genotypic tests are usually 1-2 days. In contrast, 301 phenotypic tests for antiviral susceptibility (e.g. neuraminidase inhibition assay (8)) are necessary 302 for monitoring emergence of AVR strains with previously unknown AVR mechanisms (27) . 303
Phenotypic tests are much more labor intensive than genotypic tests with a turnaround time of 1-2 304 weeks. Following the discovery of a new strain with unknown AVR mechanism, further In our first case study, we estimate that the oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus that 309 emerged and became globally dominant in 2007-2008 was 4% more transmissible than its 310 oseltamivir-sensitive predecessor. This is consistent with the findings in Chao et al (29) in which 311 the fitness advantage of the oseltamivir-resistant strain was estimated to be 1.7% to 2.4% based on 312 the rate at which it spread around the globe. Both studies indicate that an AVR strain with a fitness 313 advantage of as little as 2% to 4% would spread to fixation both locally and globally within months. 314
If large-scale antiviral intervention is implemented during a pandemic, the resulting drug pressure 315 on the AVS strain might confer such magnitude of fitness advantage to an intrinsically less 316 transmissible AVR strain. In such context, timely and robust surveillance of AVR fitness is essential 317 for informing optimal use of antivirals. For example, given that antiviral therapy will likely be the 318 first-line treatment for severe cases during a pandemic, an increase in AVR/AVS incidence ratio and 319 growing ineffectiveness of antivirals in treating AVR cases might increase the overall pandemic 320 mortality. Estimates of intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure on the AVS strain provided by our 321 method would thus be useful for assessing the risk of such outcome, though a comprehensive 322 evaluation of optimal antiviral use would require knowledge of additional parameters (e.g. 323
reproductive number, antiviral efficacy in reducing mortality, etc.) (30) . 324
325
In our method, AVR fitness corresponds to the combined effect of intrinsic AVR fitness and the drug 326 pressure posed on the AVS strain by population-wide antiviral interventions. AVR fitness will vary 327 across populations if the drug pressure in each localities are different. Therefore, comparison of 328 AVR fitness estimates from different populations should account for heterogeneities in drug 329 pressure. We have demonstrated how to do this in our case study 1 in which we jointly estimate 330 intrinsic AVR fitness and drug pressure in Japan using data from 10 populations (see Appendix page 331 4). 332
333
Our study has several important limitations. First, our method is applicable only when AVS and AVR 334 strains co-circulate and hence cannot be used to estimate the fitness of a newly emerged AVR strain 335 that has not yet spread in the community. Second, our method requires accurate specification of the 336 generation time distribution. If data on exposure or onset times of infector-infectee pairs are 337 available, our method can be extended to jointly infer the generation time distribution (see accounted for importation of AVS and AVR viruses. In the presence of such importation, our method 341 would still be valid if (i) cases with recent travel history are excluded from AVR surveillance and (ii) 342 the number of imported cases is small compared to incidence from local transmission (which is 343 generally the case after the local epidemic has undergone exponential growth for 1-2 weeks). 
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